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1. INTRODUCTION
The broad objective of the World Trade Organization ("WTO")
is "progressive liberalization" -i.e., the gradual reduction of trade
barriers over the course of successive rounds of trade negotiations.
Consistent with this goal, the WTO's Agreement on Agriculture
identifies as one of its primary objectives the "substantial progres-
sive reduction" in trade-distorting farm subsidies.1 In the Doha
Round of trade negotiations, however, the United States has been
attempting to deliberalize some of its commitments under the cur-
rently applicable rules on agriculture subsidies while at the same
time seeking further concessions on agricultural tariffs from its
trading partners. This posture by the United States, as much as
any other factor, is responsible for the current impasse in the Doha
Round negotiations, which were suspended indefinitely in July
2006.2
During the Uruguay Round trade negotiations, which were
completed in 1994, the United States agreed to reduce its overall
level of trade-distorting "Amber Box" subsidies to $19.1 billion.
Perhaps more significantly, the United States also agreed to subject
its farm supports to the generally applicable restrictions on subsi-
dies contained in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures ("SCM" Agreement) after the expiration of the Agree-
ment on Agriculture's so-called "Peace Clause" at the end of 2003.
3
As a result of that expiration, all trade-distorting farm subsidies
can be challenged under the SCM Agreement, including marketing
loan program payments, counter-cyclical payments, and, to a lesser
extent, direct payments.4 The WTO's Dispute Settlement Body has
already ruled against U.S. subsidies for upland cotton in a case
bought by Brazil; similar challenges against supports for other ma-
jor U.S. export commodities (e.g., corn, wheat, rice and soybeans)
appear likely.
1 Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establish-
ing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410, reprinted in THE
LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 43 (1999), available at http://www.wto.org/ Eng-
lish/ docs-e/legale/14-ag.pdf [hereinafter Agreement on Agriculture].
2 See infra Section 4.
3 See infra Sections 3.1.1. & 3.1.3.
4 See infra Section 5.3.2.1.
1000 [Vol. 27:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol27/iss4/2
2006] FARM SUBSIDIES AND THE WTO'S PEACE CLAUSE 1001
In the Doha Round, however, the negotiating position of the
Office of the United States Trade Representative ("USTR") has re-
flected more the significant pressure from Congress to protect farm
subsidies than the substantial commitments that the United States
has already made during the Uruguay Round. The USTR has
sought to minimize the reductions that the United States would be
required to make in Amber Box subsidies and to offset any reduc-
tions by reclassifying programs under "Blue Box" and "Green Box"
categories that are not subject to the $19.1 billion limit. Moreover,
the USTR has been pushing -unsuccessfully -for a new Peace
Clause to protect farm subsidies from challenge under the SCM
Agreement. 5 Although the USTR had made some limited progress
in winning acceptance for its box-shifting strategy before the col-
lapse of negotiations, there appears to be virtually no support for a
new Peace Clause among the other 148 Member Nations of the
WTO.6 Accordingly, U.S. commodity subsidy programs are likely
to remain vulnerable to challenges under the SCM Agreement re-
gardless of the eventual outcome of the Doha Round.
A more viable strategy for addressing the potential for conflict
between U.S. farm supports and the WTO subsidy disciplines
would focus not on attempting to negotiate a relaxation of the rele-
vant rules but rather on drafting a new Farm Bill that concentrates
funding for a wide range of programs- including rural develop-
ment, infrastructure, conservation, alternative energy, and food
programs-that are not subject to challenge under the SCM
Agreement. This approach would avoid further WTO disputes
over U.S. agricultural subsidies while permitting Congress to
maintain the current baseline of Farm Bill funding.
Section 2 of this Article discusses the evolution of the U.S. sys-
tem of farm supports and describes the primary subsidy programs
in the current Farm Bill. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the
relevant WTO rules on agricultural subsidies contained in the
Agreement on Agriculture and the SCM Agreement and suggests
two relatively simple criteria for predicting whether a particular
subsidy program is likely to be found to be impermissibly trade
distorting. Section 4 examines the United States' strategy for pro-
tecting farm subsidies in the Doha Round negotiations and ex-
5 See infra Section 4.4.
6 See id.
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plains why it is unlikely to succeed. Section 5 provides broad
guidelines for drafting a WTO-compliant Farm Bill and identifies
some existing Farm Bill programs that satisfy these guidelines.
2. SUBSIDY PROGRAMS UNDER THE FARM BILL
2.1. Pre-1996 Farm Subsidy Programs
From the 1930s through the 1990s, U.S. farm policy focused on
maintaining the stability of commodity prices through a system of
production restrictions and price-linked loan and payment pro-
grams.7 The production restrictions, such as payments to farmers
to remove land from production, limited supply and accordingly
supported prices. The loan programs effectively guaranteed pro-
ducers of certain commodities a set price by providing them with
"non-recourse loans." These loans allowed farmers to forfeit their
crop to the government's Commodity Credit Corporation in lieu of
repayment if market prices were below a pre-set target price for
the relevant commodity. 8 The deficiency payment program paid
farmers when market prices were lower than the target price con-
tingent upon their compliance with an acreage reduction program,
which limited the number of acres that could be planted with a
given commodity. 9
In the mid-1990s, the U.S. approach to agricultural subsidies
changed dramatically as Congress attempted to adapt its farm pol-
icy to new pressures and opportunities presented by international
trade. In 1994, Congress approved the results of the Uruguay
Round negotiations, which created the WTO and for the first time
subjected U.S. agricultural subsidies to significant restrictions un-
der global trade rules. 10 Most conspicuously, the United States
agreed to reduce its domestic support subsidies to $19.1 billion."
7 See Jon Lauck, After Deregulation: Constructing Agricultural Policy in the Age of
"Freedom to Farm," 5 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 3, 9-19 (2000) (providing a history of pre-
1996 farm policy in the United States).
8 See id. at 13.
9 See ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRIC. INFO. BULL. No. 624,
PROVISIONS OF THE FOOD, AGRICULTURE, CONSERVATION, AND TRADE ACT OF 1990, at
6-7, 9 (1991) available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/aib624/
aib624a.pdf.
10 See WTO Secretariat, WTO Agriculture Negotiations - The Issues, and where we
are now 5 (Dec. 1, 2004), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/agric-e/agnegs-
bkgrnde.pdf (explaining agricultural issues negotiated at the WTO between 2000
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2.2. The 1996 Farm Bill
The Federal Agriculture and Improvement and Reform Act of
1996 ("1996 Farm Bill") was designed to keep U.S. subsidies under
$19.1 billion by continuing the non-recourse loan program 12 but
eliminating deficiency payments and replacing them with fixed
payments that would gradually decrease over a period of seven
years. These "production flexibility contract" ("PFC") payments
were made available to owners and farmers of cropland covered
under the previous farm bill, with most of the money going to
producers of wheat, corn, upland cotton, and rice.13 Payments
were based upon 85% of the contract acreage and gradually re-
duced over a seven-year period ending in the 2002 fiscal year.
14
Under the PFC program's "planting flexibility" provisions, recipi-
ents of PFC payments were not required to produce any particular
commodity but were restricted from producing fruits or vegetables
on the contract acreage.15 The United States Department of Agri-
culture ("USDA") projected that this new approach to farm subsi-
dies would keep the United States far below the $19.1 billion
limit.1 6
Much of the support in Congress for this approach to farm sub-
sidies was based on the belief that the reduction in subsidy pay-
ments would be more than offset by the revenues from the in-
creased exports of commodities that were expected to result from
and 2004). Some provisions in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GAT7") did apply to agriculture products prior to the Uruguay Round, includ-
ing, to a limited degree, GATT Article XVI. See Fabian Delcros, The Legal Status of
Agriculture in the World Trade Organization, 36(2) J. WORLD TRADE 219, 223-25
(2002).
11 See infra Section 3.1.1; see also Federal Agriculture and Improvement and
Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127, §§ 111-113(b), 110 Stat. 888 (1996)). [here-
inafter 1996 Farm Bill].
12 See ECON. RES. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., THE 2002 FARM BILL: TITLE I
COMMODITY PROGRAM 5-6, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Features/farmbill/titles/
titlelcommodities.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2006) (outlining non-recourse loan pro-
gram under the 1996 and 2002 Farm Bills) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., TITLE I
COMMODITY PROGRAM].
13 1996 Farm Bill §§ 111 & 113(b).
14 Id. § 113(a).
15 Id. § 118.
16 See Frederick Nelson, U.S. Ag Policy - Well Below WFO Ceilings on Domestic
Support, AGRIC. OUTLOOK, Oct. 1997, at 26, 26-32, available at http://www.
ers.usda.gov/publications/agoutlook/oct1997/ao245h.pdf.
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the Uruguay Round.17 The projections concerning increased export
revenues for U.S. farmers, however, proved to be inaccurate.
Commodity prices collapsed in the late 1990s, and Congress re-
sponded with a series of supplemental bills that provided market
loss assistance ("MLA") payments to producers of the same com-
modities that were eligible for PFC payments.18
2.3. The 2002 Farm Bill
Congress continued to increase farm subsidies in the Farm Se-
curity and Rural Investment Act of 2002 ("2002 Farm Bill").19 The
bulk of the subsidies are provided under three programs: (1) mar-
keting loan program payments, (2) direct payments, and (3)
counter-cyclical payments.20 The marketing loan program contin-
ues in much the same form as it did in previous farm bills.21 Direct
17 See Lauck, supra note 7, at 24-31.
18 See ECON. RES. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FARM AND COMMODITY POLICY:
1996-2001 COMMODITY PROVISIONS -EMERGENCY AND SUPPLEMENTAL ASSISTANCE,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/FarmPolicy/1996emerge.htm (last updated
Oct. 18, 2006); see also Panel Report, United States -Subsidies on Upland Cotton
7.1301, WT/DS267/R (Sept. 8, 2004) ("The United States has acknowledged that
MLA payments were paid in light of low commodity prices.") [hereinafter Upland
Cotton Panel Report].
19 See Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171,
116 Stat. 134 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 Farm Bill]; U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., 2007 FARM
BILL THEME PAPERS, RISK MANAGEMENT 20 (2006), http://www.usda.gov
/documents/Farmbill07riskmgmtrev.doc ("The 2002 Farm Bill was developed
under a budget that permitted spending to increase by about $8 billion per year
above the levels projected under a continuation of the 1996 Farm Bill.") [hereinaf-
ter U.S DEP'T OF AGRIC., RISK MANAGEMENT PAPER]; see also Daniel A. Sumner, Boxed
In: Conflicts Between U.S. Farm Policies and WTO Obligations, in TRADE POL'Y
ANALYSIS No. 32, at 4 (CATO Institute 2005), at 4 (noting that farm subsidies were
increased in the 2002 Farm Bill).
20 Producers of just five commodities -upland cotton, corn, rice, wheat and
soybeans -receive about 93% of the subsidies under these programs. See infra
note 168 and accompanying text. There are also subsidy programs that benefit
other commodities -most significantly the sugar and dairy programs. Both pro-
grams function primarily by supporting the market price of the commodity rather
than by providing direct payments to farmers. The sugar program functions
through a system of price-support loans to sugar processors and tariff rate quotas
that limit the access of foreign producers to U.S. sugar market. See 2002 Farm Bill
§ 1401. Milk prices are supported through a system of government purchases of
"cheese, butter, and nonfat dry milk produced from the milk." 2002 Farm Bill §
1501.
21 2002 Farm Bill §§ 1201-09; U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., TITLE I COMMODITY
PROGRAM, supra note 12; see JIM MONKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT
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payments - the successor to the PFC program - are fixed payments
available for owners of "base acres" that were planted during the
period from 1998 to 2001 with certain crops, including corn, wheat,
upland cotton, rice, and soybeans.22 The payments are calculated
by multiplying a "payment rate" for each commodity by the
"payment acres" (85% of the base acres) and the "payment yield"
for the relevant commodity.23 As with PFC payments, owners of
base acres have "planting flexibility" but are restricted from plant-
ing fruits, vegetables or wild rice.
24
Counter-cyclical payments replaced MLA payments in the 2002
Farm Bill. Counter-cyclical payments are provided to owners of
the same base acres as direct payments but are based upon the dif-
ference between a target price established for each commodity and
the "effective price" for the commodity (the higher of either the av-
erage market price or the marketing loan rate added to the direct
payment rate for the commodity.)25 As with direct payments, no
production on the base acres is required for counter-cyclical pay-
ments, but the same planting flexibility restrictions apply.
26
3. THE PRINCIPLE WTO AGREEMENTS APPLICABLE TO FARM
SUBSIDIES: THE AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE AND THE AGREEMENT
ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES
The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations resulted in the adop-
tion of two agreements imposing significant new restrictions on
agricultural subsidies: (1) the SCM Agreement and (2) the Agree-
ment on Agriculture. As discussed in detail below, the SCM
Agreement contains rules that apply to subsidies in all sectors of
the economy and generally forbids both export subsidies and other
subsidies that can be shown to have trade-distorting effects. The
Agreement on Agriculture contains specific provisions regarding
RS21604, MARKETING LOANS, LOAN DEFICIENCY PAYMENTS, AND COMMODITY
CERTIFICATES 2-3 (2004) (explaining the marketing loan program).
22 2002 Farm Bill §§ 1001(4) & 1103. Producers of grain sorghum, barley, oats
and "other oilseeds" are also eligible for direct payments. Id. Other "oilseeds"
include "sunflower seed, rapeseed, canola, safflower, flaxseed, [and] mustard
seed...." Id. § 1001(9).
23 Id. § 1103(c).
24 Id. § 1106.
25 Id. § 1104.
26 Id. § 1106.
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agricultural subsidies, including the Peace Clause, which protected
some agricultural subsidies from challenge under the SCM Agree-
ment during a nine-year implementation period.
3.1. The Agreement on Agriculture
The Agreement on Agriculture distinguishes between two
types of subsidies: (1) "domestic support" and (2) "export subsi-
dies."
3.1.1. Domestic support
Domestic support refers to agricultural subsidies that, although
not directly linked to exports, can nonetheless encourage over-
production of agricultural products and suppress prices. Domestic
support is categorized in three "boxes" -the Amber Box, the Blue
Box, and the Green Box -although the term "boxes" is not actually
used in the Agreement on Agriculture.
The Amber Box. The Agreement on Agriculture requires most
WTO Member nations to reduce their domestic farm support from
the base level they provided between 1986 and 1988, known as the
"Total Aggregate Measurement of Support" ("Total AMS").27
These subsidies are commonly referred to as Amber Box subsidies
and are considered the most trade-distorting form of domestic
support. The limit on Amber Box subsidies for the United States at
the end of a six-year implementation period was approximately
$19.1 billion.28 Payments authorized under the 2002 Farm Bill that
qualify as Amber Box subsidies include counter-cyclical payments
and marketing loan program payments.29 In addition to the
capped level of Amber Box payments, the Agreement on Agricul-
ture also permits a country to make certain de minimis payments.
For a developed country, these payments include product-specific
support that does not exceed 5% of the value of the country's pro-
duction for that product or non-product-specific support that does
27 See Agreement on Agriculture arts. 6-7 & Annex 3.
28 Domestic Support: Total Ams Commitments, United States Schedule of Con-
cessions in Goods, Annexed to Marrakesh Protocol, G/MA/W/23/Rev.3 Sched-
ule XX, Part IV § I (last updated May 16, 2006), available at http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/schedulese/goods-schedules-tablee.htm.
29 See Appellate Body Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
763(c)(i), WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Upland Cotton Appellate
Body Report].
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not exceed 5% of the total value of the country's agricultural pro-
duction.3
0
The Blue Box. Blue box subsidies are payments to farmers
made in exchange for limiting production of the subsidized prod-
uct.31 Blue Box subsidies are considered less trade-distorting than
Amber Box subsidies because they limit rather than encourage
production, and therefore are less likely to artificially suppress
prices. Accordingly, the Agreement on Agriculture did not require
countries to limit their Blue Box payments. The United States
abandoned the use of production limiting subsidies in the 1996
Farm Bill but is currently attempting to negotiate the creation of a
new category of Blue Box subsidies that would shield counter-
cyclical payments.
32
The Green Box. Green Box subsidies include various categories
of government expenditures that are considered to be non- or
minimally trade-distorting because they do not function as price
supports and do not encourage production. Green Box payments
include both general provisions of government services, such as in-
frastructure and research, and certain direct payments to farmers,
including payments under environmental and conservation pro-
grams.33 As with Blue Box payments, the Agreement on Agricul-
ture did not cap Green Box payments.
3.1.2. Export Subsidies
Export subsidies are subsidies that are provided only for ex-
ported products.34 The Agreement on Agriculture required WTO
Member nations to reduce the amount of agricultural export subsi-
dies they provided and the quantities of agricultural products they
subsidized. 35 Developed countries such as the United States were
required to make deeper and more rapid reductions than develop-
ing countries.36 The poorest ("least developed") countries were not
30 Agreement on Agriculture art. 6.4.
31 Id. art. 6.5.
32 See discussion infra Section 4.1.-2.
33 Agreement on Agriculture Annex 2.
34 Id. art. 1(e) ("'export subsidies' refers to subsidies contingent upon export
performance ... ").
35 See id. arts. 3.3 & 8-9.
36 Developed countries were required to reduce the amount of export subsi-
dies by 36% and the quantities of subsidized agricultural products by 21% over a
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required to make any reductions, 37 although these countries typi-
cally do not have the financial resources to provide significant sub-
sidies.
3.1.3. The Peace Clause
Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture -known as the
"Peace Clause" -prohibited most challenges to agricultural subsi-
dies under the SCM Agreement as long as countries complied with
their obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture and did not
exceed the level of support they provided to a specific commodity
in 1992.38 However, the Peace Clause applied only "during the
implementation period," 39 which expired on January 1, 2004.40
Accordingly, all agricultural subsidies are now subject to challenge
under the provisions of the SCM Agreement - regardless of whether they
are categorized as export subsidies or Amber, Blue, or Green Box domestic
support.41 Note that this does not necessarily mean that all farm
six-year period. Developing countries were required to reduce the amount of ex-
port subsidies for agricultural products by 24% and the amount of products sub-
sidized by 14% over a ten year period.
37 Agreement on Agriculture art. 15.2.
38 Id. art. 13. The Peace Clause did not preclude all challenges to agricultural
subsidies. Amber and Blue Box subsidies, for example, were subject to counter-
vailing duty actions if a "determination of injury or threat thereof" from the sub-
sidy was made, though Members were required to exercise "due restraint" in
bringing actions of this kind. See id. art. 13(b)(i).
39 Id. art. 13.
40 For the purposes of the Peace Clause, the implementation period "means
the nine-year period commencing in 1995." Id. art. 1(f). The United States has
suggested that the implementation period for the Peace Clause should be calcu-
lated by reference to the 1995 marketing year for affected commodities, not the
calendar year. Under this interpretation, the Peace Clause expired for different
commodities on different dates in 2004. See U.S., EU Question Expiration of Peace
Clause on Agriculture Suits, INSIDE US TRADE (October 10, 2003).
41 See Richard H. Steinberg & Timothy E. Josling, WAhen the Peace Ends: The
Vulnerability of EC and US Agricultural Subsidies to WTO Legal Challenge, 6 J. INT'L
ECON L. 369, 388 (2003) (" [E]xport subsidies, Amber Box, Blue Box, and Green Box
measures.., are [all] actionable ... upon expiry of the Peace Clause .. "). See
also Raj Bhala, World Agricultural Trade in Purgatory: The Uruguay Round Agricul-
ture Agreement and its Implications for the Doha Round, 79 N.D. L. REV. 691, 824-25
(2003) ("Assuming [the Peace Clause] is not extended during the Doha Round,
WTO Members will not enjoy legal security simply by complying with their
commitments under the Agriculture Agreement .... Their programs will be sub-
ject to scrutiny, and cleansing via WTO litigation, under the SCM Agreement.")
(emphasis in original); Matthew Newell, Note, Cotton, U.S. Domestic Policy, and
Trade Wars: The Future of IAVTO Agricultural Negotiations, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
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programs within these categories are illegal under the SCM
Agreement- subsidies generally must be proven to have trade-
distorting effects in order to be found to violate the SCM Agree-
ment.42 The expiration of the Peace Clause, however, does mean
that government payments to farmers are no longer protected from
challenge simply because they are classified within the Green or
the Blue Box, or because the United States has not exceeded its
$19.1 billion Amber Box limit.
It has been suggested that agricultural subsidies are still pro-
tected from challenge under the SCM Agreement despite the expi-
ration of the Peace Clause. This argument is based primarily on
the contention that the Agreement on Agriculture's specific provi-
sions on agricultural subsidies should prevail over the general sub-
sidy rules of the SCM Agreement if the two conflict.43 Proponents
of this position also point to Article 21 of the Agreement on Agri-
culture, which states that other multilateral WTO agreements -
which include the SCM Agreement-apply subject to the provi-
sions of the Agreement on Agriculture.44
Yet neither the principle that the more specific treaty governs
in the event of a conflict nor Article 21 support the proposition that
agricultural subsidies continue to be protected from challenge un-
der the SCM Agreement. Instead, they merely indicate that the
Agreement on Agriculture prevails in the event of any conflict with
the SCM Agreement. The relevant questions, therefore, are which
provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture purport to protect ag-
301, 313 (2005) ("As a result [of the expiration of the Peace Clause], the full sub-
stantive and legal apparatus of the WTO is, for the first time, available to member
countries for challenging EU and U.S. agricultural subsidies.").
42 Export subsidies are prohibited under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement
without any need to demonstrate that they have trade-distorting effects, at least to
the extent that they exceed a Member's scheduled commitments. See discussion
infra Section 3.2.2.
43 See Didier Chambovey, How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the
W/TO Agreement on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in
the WATO Framework, 36(2) J. WORLD TRADE 305, 310 (2002) ("[Tihe specificity of the
[Agreement on Agriculture's] rules on subsidies indicates that its object and pur-
pose are to create a distinct legal regime, tailor-made for agricultural products,
and that the general rule (the SCM Agreement) simply does not suit the particular
conditions of agriculture.").
44 See Delcros, supra note 10, at 249-51; see also Agreement on Agriculture art.
21.1 ("The provisions of GAT 1994 and of other Multilateral Trade Agreements
in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement shall apply subject to the provisions of this
Agreement.").
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ricultural subsidies from challenge under the SCM Agreement, and
what is the scope and (more importantly) duration of that protec-
tion?
The only article of the Agreement on Agriculture that refers to
the SCM Agreement is the Peace Clause. The introductory phrase
of the Peace Clause states that it only protects agricultural subsi-
dies from challenge "[d]uring the implementation period," which
ended January 1, 2004. Consequently, the protections afforded to
subsidies under the Peace Clause no longer apply. An alternative
reading of the Agreement on Agriculture holding that it continues
to shield farm subsidies from challenge under the SCM Agreement
despite the expiration of the Peace Clause would render the Peace
Clause redundant, thus violating the principle of "effective inter-
pretation" pursuant to which treaties are to be interpreted to give
effect to all of their provisions.
45
The WTO's Appellate Body applied this doctrine in the Upland
Cotton dispute when it addressed the relationship between the
Agreement on Agriculture and the SCM Agreement in the context
of evaluating the legality of payments to users of domestically-
produced cotton under the "Step 2" program.46 The Appellate
Body rejected the argument made by the United States that because
these payments were consistent with the Agreement on Agricul-
ture's provisions on domestic support, they were exempt from Ar-
ticle 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement's prohibition on import substitu-
tion subsidies (i.e. "subsidies contingent... upon the use of
domestic over imported goods"). 47 The Appellate Body observed
that:
[A] treaty interpreter must read all applicable provisions of
a treaty in a way that gives meaning to all of them, harmo-
niously.... Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement can be read
together with the Agreement on Agriculture provisions relat-
ing to domestic support in a coherent and consistent man-
45 See Steinberg & Josling, supra note 41, at 375; Chambovey, supra note 43, at
309.
46 See Upland Cotton Appellate Body Report, supra note 29, 529-52.
47 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 3.1(b), Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1A, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), reprinted in LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND 164 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
docs.e/legal-e/24-scm.pdf [hereinafter SCM Agreement].
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ner which gives full and effective meaning to all of their
terms. 48
Giving "full and effective meaning" to the Peace Clause would
presumably require avoiding an interpretation that makes its time-
limited protection from challenges under the SCM Agreement re-
dundant. Accordingly, given the expiration of the Peace Clause,
the most relevant rules governing the current WTO legality of farm
subsidies are not those contained in the Agreement on Agriculture
but rather those contained in the SCM Agreement.
3.2. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
The SCM Agreement applies to a subsidy in any economic sec-
tor if that subsidy is "specific" 49 - i.e., if eligibility for the subsidy is
limited "to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or in-
dustries. ... "50 Like the Agreement on Agriculture, the SCM
Agreement distinguishes between export subsidies and subsidies
not based on whether a product is exported. This latter category is
referred to as "actionable" or "yellow light" subsidies.
3.2.1. Actionable Subsidies
In order to be considered illegal, actionable subsidies must be
shown to be trade-distorting-i.e., to cause "adverse effects to the
interests of other Members." 51 Although there are a variety of
ways in which a WTO Member country can demonstrate that an-
other country's subsidies are illegally trade-distorting, the most
important standard is whether the subsidies cause "serious preju-
dice." 52 Serious prejudice can be proven by demonstrating that the
48 Upland Cotton Appellate Body Report, supra note 29, 549 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
49 SCM Agreement art. 1.2 ("A subsidy... shall be subject to the provisions
of Part II ["Prohibited Subsidies"] or subject to the provisions of Part III ["Action-
able Subsidies"] or V ["Countervailing Measures"] only if such a subsidy is spe-
cific in accordance with the provisions of Article 2.").
50 Id. art. 2.1. Some subsidies, such as prohibited "red light" subsidies, are
treated as automatically specific. See id. art. 2.3 ("Any subsidy falling under the
provisions of Article 3 shall be deemed to be specific.").
51 Id. art. 5.
52 Id. art. 5 ("No Member should cause, through the use of any subsidy ...
adverse effects to the interests of other Members .. "). Three types of "adverse
effects" are identified in Article 5: "(a) injury to the domestic industry of another
Member; (b) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly to other
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subsidies either permit a country to take a portion of the complain-
ing country's market share for a particular commodity 3 or by
demonstrating that the subsidies have an adverse effect on prices
for the commodity, including by causing "significant price sup-
pression." 54
Although the Upland Cotton dispute involved subsidies that
were provided from 1999 to 2002-prior to the expiration of the
Peace Clause-the Panel and Appellate Body held that the Peace
Clause did not protect the domestic support subsidies from chal-
lenge under the SCM Agreement because the level of support pro-
vided to producers of upland cotton during those years exceeded
the level provided in 1992.55 Accordingly, the Upland Cotton dis-
pute provides useful insights into how the provisions of the SCM
Members under GATT 1994... [and] (c) serious prejudice to the interests of an-
other Member." For an explanation of the difficulties involved in prosecuting "in-
jury to domestic industry" or "nullification and impairment" claims, see Steinberg
& Josling, supra note 41, at 379-85. In addition to bringing actions based on "ad-
verse effects" suffered, WTO Members may also impose countervailing duties on
subsidized imports pursuant to the provisions of Article VI of the GATT and Part
V of the SCM Agreement.
53 See SCM Agreement art. 6.3
Serious prejudice in the sense of paragraph (c) of Article 5 may arise in
any case where one or several of the following apply:
(a) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the imports of a like
product of another Member into the market of the subsidizing Member;
(b) the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the exports of a like
product of another Member from a third country market;
(d) the effect of the subsidy is an increase in the world market share of
the subsidizing Member in a particular subsidized primary product or
commodity as compared to the average share it had during the previous
period of three years and this increase follows a consistent trend over a
period when subsidies have been granted.
54 Id. art. 6.3(c) (stating that serious prejudice may arise where "the effect of
the subsidy is a significant price undercutting by the subsidized product as com-
pared with the price of a like product of another Member in the same market or
significant price suppression, price depression or lost sales in the same market.").
55 Upland Cotton Panel Report, supra note 18, 7.415-.608; Upland Cotton
Appellate Body Report, supra note 29, 345-94. See also Agreement on Agricul-
ture art. 13(b) ("[D]omestic support measures.., shall be... exempt from actions
based on... Articles 5 and 6 of the [SCM] Agreement, provided that such measures
do not grant support to a specific commodity in excess of that decided during the 1992
marketing year .. ") (emphasis added).
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Agreement regarding actionable subsidies will apply to agricul-
tural subsidies in general now that the Peace Clause has expired.
The Appellate Body affirmed the Panel's finding that four
price-contingent subsidy programs -marketing loan program
payments, counter-cyclical payments, market loss assistance pay-
ments, and Step 2 payments -caused significant price suppression
in the world market for upland cotton.5 6 The Appellate Body
noted that the Panel had considered a variety of arguments and a
"voluminous evidentiary record... including several economic
studies and substantial data" in reaching this conclusion.57 Argua-
bly, however, two attributes of these programs were particularly
significant: (1) the magnitude of the subsidies58 and (2) the degree
to which the subsidies were linked to the price of upland cotton.59
56 See Upland Cotton Appellate Body Report, supra note 29, 496. The Panel
addressed the "significant price suppression" analysis as being comprised of three
separate inquires: (1) whether price suppression" exists; if so, (2) whether it is
"significant"; and (3) whether it is the "effect" of the subsidies. Upland Cotton
Panel Report, supra note 18, 7.1275-7.1315 ("price suppression"); T 7.1316-
7.1333 ("significant"); 7.1334-7.1363 ("effect of the subsidy").
57 Among the other factors considered by the Panel (and approved by the
Appellate Body) were (1) the "substantial proportionate influence" that the
United States had on the world market for upland cotton due to its high levels of
production and export of cotton, Upland Cotton Appellate Body Report, supra
note 29, 419 & 449 (discussing the relevance of the magnitude of United States
production and export of upland cotton in evaluating whether there has been
"price suppression" and whether it has been "significant"); (2) the "'temporal co-
incidence of suppressed world market prices' and the price-contingent subsidies,"
id. 419 & 451 (quoting Upland Cotton Panel Report, supra note 18, 7.1351); and
(3) the "divergence between United States producers' costs of production and
revenue from sales of upland cotton," id. 452 (quoting Upland Cotton Panel Re-
port, supra note 18, 7.1353). The Panel's analysis was less than a model of clar-
ity, and although the Appellate Body upheld its findings regarding serious preju-
dice, it criticized the Panel's explanation of its analytical methodology:
[W]e believe that, in its reasoning, the Panel could have provided a more
detailed explanation of its analysis of the complex facts and economic
arguments arising in this dispute. The Panel could have done so in order
to demonstrate precisely how it evaluated the different factors bearing
on the relationship between the price-contingent subsidies and signifi-
cant price suppression.
Upland Cotton Appellate Body Report, supra note 29, 458. See also Richard H.
Steinberg, United States -Subsidies on Upland Cotton, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 852, 860
(2005) ("[T]he Panel's causation analysis... lacked rigor and specificity, which
may diminish the persuasiveness and effectiveness of the opinion.").
58 See discussion infra Section 3.2.1.1.
59 See discussion infra Section 3.2.1.2.
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3.2.1.1. Magnitude of the subsidies
The Panel cited the "readily available evidence of the order of
magnitude of the subsidies" in concluding that the subsidies
caused price suppression that was "significant." 60 The Appellate
Body also stressed the importance of this (intuitively obvious) fac-
tor, observing that:
[I]n assessing whether "the effect of the subsidy is ... sig-
nificant price suppression", and ultimately serious preju-
dice, a panel will need to consider the effects of the subsidy
on prices. The magnitude of the subsidy is an important factor
in this analysis. A large subsidy. . . is likely to have a greater
impact on prices than a small subsidy .... All other things be-
ing equal, the smaller the subsidy for a given product, the
smaller the degree to which it will affect the costs or reve-
nue of the recipient, and the smaller its likely impact on the
prices charged by the recipient for the product.
61
The Appellate Body rejected the argument made by the United
States that the Panel had erred in failing to quantify the amount of
subsidies (as would have been required in a countervailing duty
action), concluding that "[a] precise, definitive quantification of the
subsidy is not required." 62 The Appellate Body did concede, how-
ever, that "the Panel could have been more explicit and specified
what it meant by 'very large amounts"' when discussing the mag-
nitude of the subsidies.63
The failure of both the Panel and the Appellate Body to provide
guidance on what magnitude subsidies must reach in order to
cause significant price suppression has been criticized as depriving
WTO Members of guidance on what levels of farm subsidies are
permissible. 64 However, a case can be made that any rate of sub-
60 See Upland Cotton Panel Report, supra note 18, 7.1332 ("[G]iven... the
readily available evidence of the order of magnitude of the subsidies, we are cer-
tainly not, by any means, looking at an insignificant or unimportant world price
phenomenon.").
61 Upland Cotton Appellate Body Report, supra note 29, 461 (emphasis
added).
62 Id. 467.
63 Id. 468.
64 As recently noted by Stephen J. Powell and & Andrew Schmitz:
What the Panel and the Appellate Body have overlooked... is that their
failure to devise a quantitative standard for serious prejudice leaves
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sidization exceeding 5% should be considered potentially trade-
distorting.
Article 6.1 of the SCM Agreement identifies certain categories
of subsides-known as "Dark Amber" subsidies-which are pre-
sumed to cause serious prejudice, including those subsidies that
exceed 5% of a product's value.65 Although Article 6.1 expired at
the end of 1999,66 several WTO Members have supported a renewal
of the Dark Amber provision.67 The United States has gone even
further, proposing to reinstate the 5% threshold not just as the ba-
sis for a rebuttable presumption that serious prejudice has oc-
curred but as a new category of prohibited "red light" subsidy un-
der Article 3 of the SCM Agreement 68 (although this proposal was
WTO Members completely without guidance on how to bring their agri-
cultural support programs into WTO compliance.... [T]he lack of quan-
tification in effect tells Members to do nothing, because further dispute
settlement litigation will be required before any rule may emerge that is
capable of implementation.
See Stephen J. Powell & Andrew Schmitz, The Cotton and Sugar Subsidies Decisions:
WTO's Dispute Settlement System Rebalances the Agreement on Agriculture, 10 DRAKE
J. AGRIC. L. 287, 309 (2005).
65 SCM Agreement art. 6.1(a). Article 6.1 also created a presumption of seri-
ous prejudice for the following types of subsidies:
(b) subsidies to cover operating losses sustained by an industry;
(c) subsidies to cover operating losses sustained by an enterprise, other
than one-time measures which are non-recurrent and cannot be repeated
for that enterprise and which are given merely to provide time for the
development of long-term solutions and to avoid acute social problems;
(d) direct forgiveness of debt, i.e. forgiveness of government-held debt,
and grants to cover debt repayment.
SCM Agreement art. 6.1(b)-(d). The presumption may be rebutted by demon-
strating that the subsidy did not result in any of the market displacement or price
effects identified in art. 6.3. See id. art. 6.2 (providing that prejudice will not be
found if the subsidy did not result in the outcome listed in paragraph 3).
66 See Id. art. 31 (stipulating that the provisions in Articles 6.1, 8, and 9 apply
for five years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement).
67 See Proposal from the United States, United States - Expanding the Prohibited
"Red Light" Subsidy Category, TN/RL/GEN/94, n.7 (Jan. 16, 2006) ("We... note
that other Members have called for the reinstatement of the 'dark amber' category
of subsidies under the lapsed provisions of Article 6.1.") [hereinafter Proposal
from the United States].
68 Id. at 2 ("[Plractices similar to those listed in the now-lapsed 'dark amber'
provisions of Article 6.1 of the Subsidies Agreement should be the first candidates
for inclusion in an expanded prohibited category of subsidies."). See also Com-
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made "without prejudice to any new subsidy rules developed in
the agriculture negotiations").69
The Agreement on Agriculture also supports the significance of
the 5% threshold, providing both that subsidies at or below 5% of
the value of a Member's production of an agricultural product and
non-product-specific subsidies at or below 5% of the total value of
a Member's agricultural production shall be treated as de minimis
and exempted from the calculation of its Amber Box support.
70
The United States has even proposed reducing the de minimis
threshold to 2.5%.71
The United States routinely provides commodity subsidies that
exceed the 5% threshold to producers of at least four commodities.
According to the USDA, the ratio of subsidies to market value av-
eraged 63% for rice producers, 50% for cotton producers, 23% for
corn producers, and 17% for wheat producers during the crop
years 2002-2005.72 It should be stressed that the 5% threshold does
not currently constitute a bright-line threshold for identifying sub-
sidies that conflict with the SCM Agreement. It is, however, a use-
ful indicator of whether subsidies for a given commodity may be
subject to challenge, particularly when considered in conjunction
with an assessment of the extent to which the subsidies are price-
contingent.
munication from the United States, United States -Subsidies Disciplines Requiring
Clarification and Improvement, TN/RL/W/78 (Mar. 19, 2003) (identifying a range of
issues that the Rules Group could address).
69 Proposal from the United States, supra note 67, at 2 n.4.
70 Agreement on Agriculture art. 6(4)(a). The de minimis threshold for devel-
oping Members countries is 10%. Id. art. 6(4)(b).
71 See Press Release, U.S. Dept. St., U.S. Offers Plan on Agriculture for Hong
Kong Trade Talks (Oct. 10, 2005), available at http://usinfo.state.gov
/ei/Archive/2005/Oct/11-639505.htnl (proposing that "product-specific and
non-product-specific de minimis [be] cut by 50%.") [hereinafter U.S. Agriculture
Proposal]; Cover Letter Unofficial Draft from the WTO Chairman of the Commit-
tee on Agriculture, Special Session to the Chairman of the [WTO] Trade Negotia-
tions Committee, Draft Possible Modalities on Agriculture, 62, JOB(06)/199 (June
22, 2006) (suggesting that the de minimis threshold could be reduced by as much as
80%) [hereinafter 2006 Draft Possible Modalities].
72 U.S DEP'T OF AGRIC., RISK MANAGEMENT PAPER, supra note 19, at 10. The
USDA estimated an ad valorem rate of only 4% for soybeans during the same pe-
riod. Id. Daniel Sumner, however, has projected that soybean subsidies for 2006
will increase to 27.4% of market value. See Sumner, supra note 19, at 15.
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3.2.1.2. Price contingency
In addition to the magnitude of the subsidies provided, the
Panel and the Appellate Body also stressed the importance of ex-
amining whether certain subsidies are price-contingent in evaluat-
ing whether those subsidies cause significant price suppression.
73
The Panel distinguished between two categories of subsidies:
"those that are directly price-contingent, and those that are not....
[T]his distinction is critical for the purposes of our price suppres-
sion analysis in terms of the nexus which the subsidies have to any
price suppression and to the subsidized product at issue."74 The
Panel addressed four price-contingent subsidy programs-the
marketing loan program, Step 2 user marketing payments, MLA
payments, and counter-cyclical payments. The Panel concluded
that these programs encouraged U.S. producers to maintain or in-
crease production of cotton when prices were low, thus suppress-
ing prices in the world market by increasing supply.75
However, the Panel found that non-price-contingent subsi-
dies - direct payments (as well as the PFC payments they replaced)
and crop insurance subsidies - did not contribute to significant
price suppression. The Panel acknowledged that direct payments
"enhance producer wealth and investment potential, including
lowering of risk aversion" 76 and that crop insurance subsidies
73 See Upland Cotton Panel Report, supra note 18, 7.1190 ("A massive ('inef-
ficient') subsidy of a certain design may have relatively miniscule effects, whereas
a smaller subsidy of a different nature may have relatively greater effects.").
74 Id. 7.1289.
75 Id. 7.1308 ("[Sleveral of the United States subsidies are directly linked to
world prices for upland cotton, thereby numbing the response of United States
producers to production adjustment decisions when prices are low."); see also id.
7.1309 ("Neither party... disputes the proposition that suppressed world prices
may follow from an increased supply being infused on the world market, over
and above existing available world supply of fungible upland cotton.").
76 Moreover the report observes:
PFC payments and [direct payments] mean higher cash flow and higher
wealth in terms of net worth for United States upland cotton producers.
United States producers that enroll under the PFC and [direct payment]
programmes obtain an entitlement to receive future payments which in-
creases their net wealth. This will have various predictable effects, in-
cluding enhanced investment prospects due to better access to loans (as
the producers are perceived as having a lower risk of default); ability to
pay existing loans and other debt; a lowered aversion to risk which may
allow a producer to assume riskier planting strategies; and an income-
stabilizing effect as a producer may make production decisions taking
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"have positive ramifications for producer wealth and investment
and economic stability." 77 Nonetheless, the Panel concluded that
because these subsidies are not price-contingent they are "more
concerned with income support than directly with world price ef-
fects" 78 and held that they did not contribute to price suppression
in the world market for upland cotton.
Given the Panel's recognition that non-price contingent subsi-
dies could contribute both to a farmer's capacity and his inclination
to increase production by increasing wealth and lowering risk
aversion, it is difficult to explain its conclusion that these subsidies
did not contribute to price suppression as anything other than a
formalistic distinction based on their lack of price contingency. 79
Moreover, even if the Panel found that the non-price contingent
subsidies by themselves did not cause significant price suppres-
sion, it is not clear why it declined to aggregate them with the price
contingent subsidies in its price suppression analysis. In contrast,
the Panel concluded that it was appropriate to aggregate the price
contingent subsidies80 and even noted that the potential that direct
payments could affect production decisions was greater when they
were "considered in conjunction" with price-contingent pay-
ments.81
The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel regarding the "im-
portant role" 82 of price contingency in the significant price sup-
pression analysis but noted that it "d[id] not exclude the possibility
that challenged subsidies that are not 'price-contingent' ... could
into account this government revenue stream of income.
Id. 7.1305 n.1417.
77 Id. 7.1306.
78 Id. 7.1350; see also id., 7.1307 ("The particular facts and circumstances of
this dispute... indicate[]... that these particular [non-price-contingent] subsidies
are more directed at income support.").
79 See Steinberg, supra note 57, at 860 ("[D]eeper economic analysis could
have been used [by the Panel in the Upland Cotton dispute] to determine whether
the challenged non-price-contingent subsidies caused price suppression and to
estimate the extent to which each of the challenged subsidies -whether price-
contingent or not -caused price suppression.").
80 See Upland Cotton Panel Report, supra note 18, 7.1194 ("To the extent a
sufficient nexus exists between certain subsidies and any suppression of prices of
the subsidized product, we aggregate these subsidies and their effects.").
81 See id. 7.1305, n.1417.
82 Upland Cotton Appellate Body Report, supra note 29, 450.
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have some effect on production and exports and contribute to price
suppression." 83  A significant body of economic literature -
including analysis by the USDA-supports the Appellate Body's
suggestion that non-price contingent subsidies could have trade-
distorting effects.
8 4
In a future dispute, a Panel could apply a less formalistic ap-
proach and conclude that non-price-contingent subsidies contrib-
ute to price suppression, particularly if the magnitude of the subsi-
dies is great enough or if the Panel determines that it is appropriate
to aggregate the effects of price contingent and non-price contin-
gent subsidies.85 Moreover, aggregation of all actionable subsidies
would most likely be required if the United States is successful in
its proposal to reinstate the 5% ad valorem threshold as a new cate-
gory of prohibited subsidy.8 6
83 Id. 450, n.589.
84 As recently noted by Westcott and Young:
[S]ince PFC payments raise farmers' income and financial well-being,
they can potentially affect agricultural investment and thereby enhance
production. Lenders are more willing to make loans to farmers with
higher guaranteed incomes and lower risk of default. Greater loan avail-
ability facilitates additional agricultural production. Increased income
from PFC payments also allows farmers, particularly those constrained
by debt or limited liquidity, to more easily invest in their farm operation.
The resulting increased investment in farming operations contributes to
higher agricultural production in the long run... Government crop in-
surance subsidies are likely to alter producer behavior because they
lower the cost of purchasing coverage. The cost reduction represents a
benefit to producers that raises expected returns per acre and provides
an incentive to expand area in crop production.
Paul C. Westcott & C. Edwin Young, US Farm Program Benefits: Links to Planting
Decisions and Agricultural Markets, AGRIC. OUTLOOK, Oct. 2000, at 10, 11, available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/agoutlook/oct2000/ao275e.pdf. But see
ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRIC. ECON. REP. No. 838:
DECOUPLED PAYMENTS IN A CHANGING POLICY SETTING (2004), at 17, available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer838/aer838.pdf ("Despite a variety of
potential indirect effects of decoupled programs on farmers' decisions, produc-
tion effects are likely smaller than direct effect of price- and production-linked
coupled programs such as marketing loans."). See also id. at 24 (concluding that
production increases attributed to decoupled payments are "negligible").
85 Daniel Sumner suggests aggregating the effects of non-price contingent
subsidies with the effects of price-contingent supports in calculating the overall
effect of subsidy programs on commodity prices, with allowances made for "the
relatively lower stimulus that non-price-contingent subsidies provide for produc-
tion .... See Sumner, supra note 19, at 22.
86 As noted supra note 69 and accompanying text, it is not clear whether the
5% threshold would be applicable to agriculture.
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3.2.2. Prohibited subsidies
Under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement, export subsidies and
import substitution subsidies87 are prohibited (sometimes referred
to as "red light" subsidies) without any need to demonstrate that
they have trade distorting effects. As illustrated by the Upland Cot-
ton dispute, agricultural export subsidies that exceeded a Member
country's scheduled commitments were subject to the prohibition
on export subsidies even when the Peace Clause was in effect. The
Appellate Body found that Step 2 payments for exporters of cot-
ton-an unscheduled product- violated both the Agreement on
Agriculture's prohibition on export subsidies for agricultural
products and the SCM Agreement's prohibition on export subsi-
dies.88 The Appellate Body similarly held that export credit guar-
antees that violated scheduled commitments under the Agreement
on Agriculture violated Article 3 of the SCM Agreement. 89
Arguably, export subsidies that do not exceed a Member's
scheduled commitments are also prohibited under the SCM
Agreement now that the Peace Clause has expired. The Peace
Clause states that during the implementation period export subsi-
dies that conform to a Member country's scheduled commitments
are exempt from challenge under either the SCM Agreement's
provisions regarding prohibited subsidies or its provisions regard-
ing "actionable" subsidies.90 Presumably, now that the Peace
87 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
88 See Upland Cotton Appellate Body Report, supra note 29, 7 583 ("We up-
hold the Panel's findings ... that... in providing [Step 2 payments to exporters of
cotton] the United States has acted inconsistently with its obligations under Arti-
cles 3.3 and 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture."); id. 584 ("We uphold the
Panel's findings ... that Step 2 payments provided to exporters of United States
upland cotton.., are inconsistent with Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the SCM Agree-
ment.").
89 Id. 574 ("[W]e uphold the Panel's findings... that these export credit
guarantee programs are export subsidies for purposes of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM
Agreement and are inconsistent with Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of that Agreement").
The holding regarding export credit guarantees applies not just to cotton but to
the provision of export credit guarantees to certain other unscheduled commodi-
ties and one scheduled commodity (rice). Id. TT 677-78; see also Upland Cotton
Panel Report, supra note 18, 8.1(d) (concluding that "United States export credit
guarantees under the General Sales Manager ("GSM") 102 and 103 and SCGP ex-
port credit guarantee programmes: (i) in respect of exports of upland cotton and
other unscheduled agricultural products supported under the programmes, and
in respect of one scheduled product (rice)").
90 See Agreement on Agriculture art.13(a) ("During the implementation pe-
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Clause has expired, that protection has also expired.
Some commentators, however, have taken the position that ag-
ricultural export subsidies within scheduled limits are not prohib-
ited, but are merely actionable. 91 This interpretation is based on
Article 3 of the SCM Agreement and Article 8 of the Agreement on
Agriculture. 92 Article 3 of the SCM Agreement states that export
subsidies are prohibited "except as provided in the Agreement on
Agriculture." Article 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture indicates
that Member countries may not provide export subsidies that do
not conform to their scheduled commitments. The interaction of
these two provisions, it is argued, indicates that agricultural export
subsidies that are in conformity with scheduled commitments are
not subject to the prohibition of Article 3 of the SCM Agreement,
although they are actionable.
93
The difficulty with this argument is that Article 8 of the
Agreement on Agriculture does not address the status of export
subsidies after the expiration of the Peace Clause or provide any
exemption from the requirements of the SCM Agreement. Instead,
it simply states that Members may not provide export subsidies ex-
cept as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture and their sched-
ules. As with domestic support, the only provision in the Agree-
ment on Agriculture that explicitly protects export subsidies from
riod, notwithstanding the provisions of GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Subsi-
dies and Countervailing Measures domestic support measures that conform fully
to the provisions of Annex 2 to this Agreement shall be non-actionable subsidies
for purposes of countervailing duties ... ").
91 See Steinberg & Josling, supra note 41, at 378 ("[A]fter the peace period, ag-
ricultural export subsidies that conform with the Agriculture Agreement will be
legal, although they may be regulated and actionable...."); Chambovey, supra
note 43, at 348 (noting that "it is extremely difficult to conceive how, after the
lapsing of the Peace Clause, a treaty interpreter could conclude that URAA
[Agreement on Agriculture] consistent export subsidies are prohibited under the
SCM Agreement," but conceding that "there are some distinguishable features of
export subsidies that may ease the task of a complainant to back up its allegations
of serious prejudice, and thus enhance the prospects for a successful WTO ac-
tion"); Delcros supra note 10, at 250 n.69 ("[E]xport subsidies that are authorized
in Members' commitments benefit from a permanent exception to the application
of Article 3 [of the SCM Agreement].").
92 See Steinberg & Josling, supra note 41, at 377-78; Chambovey, supra note 43,
at 347.
93 See Chambovey, supra note 43, at 346 n.102 ("The use of agricultural export
subsidies beyond such scheduled limits is in effect prohibited by Article 3.3, Arti-
cle 8 and Article 10 of the Agreement on Agriculture.").
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the prohibition contained in Article 3 of the SCM agreement is the
Peace Clause, specifically Article 13(c)(ii). This provision, like the
other sections of the Peace Clause, is qualified by the introductory
phrase "[d]uring the implementation period." This presumably
means that after the implementation period this provision is no
longer operative, and agricultural export subsidies are subject to
the prohibition of Article 3 of the SCM Agreement. Moreover, if
export subsidies as scheduled under the Agreement on Agriculture
were still protected from challenge under Article 3 of the SCM
Agreement, the language in Article 13(c)(ii) would be superfluous,
violating the doctrine of effective implementation.94
The Appellate Body's report in the Upland Cotton dispute ap-
pears to support a narrow reading of the "except as provided in
the Agreement on Agriculture" qualification of Article 3 of the
SCM Agreement. The Appellate Body observed that this language
"makes it clear that the Agreement on Agriculture prevails over Arti-
cle 3 of the SCM Agreement, but only to the extent that the former con-
tains an exception." 9
5
Regardless of which interpretation is correct, it is fair to say
that all agricultural export subsidies are currently either prohibited
or actionable under the SCM Agreement.
4. THE UNITED STATES' STRATEGY FOR PROTECTING FARM
SUBSIDIES IN THE DOHA ROUND OF WTO NEGOTIATIONS
Pursuant to a mandate contained in Article 20 of the Agree-
ment on Agriculture, negotiations began in 2000 on further liber-
alization of agricultural trade beyond the commitments made in
the Uruguay Round.96 Those negotiations were subsumed into the
94 See id. at 348 ("Under the preceding reasoning it is obvious that such an ex-
emption is superfluous and tautological. The relevant portion of the Peace Clause
would then be reduced to inutility or redundancy, an event that would be disso-
nant with the principle of effectiveness in the interpretation of treaties.").
95 Upland Cotton Appellate Body Report, supra note 29, 530 (emphasis
added).
96 See Agreement on Agriculture art. 20 ("Recognizing that the long-term ob-
jective of substantial progressive reductions in support and protection resulting in
fundamental reform is an ongoing process, Members agree that negotiations for
continuing the process will be initiated one year before the end of the implemen-
tation period ... "). The implementation period-for purposes other than the
Peace Clause-expired at the end of 2000. See id., art. 1(f) ("'implementation .pe-
riod' means the six-year period commencing in the year 1995 .... ).
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broader Doha Round trade negotiations, launched in Doha, Qatar
in November 2001.
97
In the Doha Round negotiations, the United States has been at-
tempting to protect its farm subsidy programs by making limited
concessions regarding the permissible levels and classifications of
subsidies under the Agreement on Agriculture while securing a
new Peace Clause that would limit challenges to farm subsidies
under the SCM Agreement. The success of this effort is dependent
on the completion of negotiations, which were suspended in July
2006 primarily because of broad disagreements over agriculture. 98
The wide range of issues that remain to be resolved was reflected
in the 2006 Draft Possible Modalities on Agriculture, which was re-
leased by the Chairman of the WTO's Committee on Agriculture in
late June 2006. The draft contained over 700 sections of bracketed
text addressing a multitude of issues, including the basic formulas
for reducing both subsidies and tariffs.99
Even if the negotiations are resumed and the impasse over ag-
ricultural trade is broken, Member nations must agree on numer-
ous other issues in order to complete the Doha Round, including
tariffs on industrial goods and trade in services.100 The negotiators
have missed a series of deadlines - most recently an April 30, 2006
deadline to establish the detailed outlines of final agreements
known as "modalities" and a July 31, 2006 deadline for "compre-
hensive draft schedules" of tariff and subsidy commitments.' 0l
97 See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November
2001, 13-14, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Dec-
laration].
98 See Doha Round Suspended Indefinitely After G-6 Talks Collapse, BRIDGES-
WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST, July 26, 2006, available at http://www.
ictsd.org/weekly/06-07-26/storyl.htm ("The Doha Round of trade negotiations
was put into deep freeze on 24 July, after a meeting of ministers from six key
trading nations collapsed over divisions on how to cut farm subsidies and tar-
iffs.").
99 See Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture, 2006 Draft Possible
Modalities on Agriculture, TN/AG/W/3 (July 12, 2006).
100 See Negotiating Group on Market Access, Towards NAMA Modalities,
TN/MA/W/80 (July 19, 2006).
101 See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December
2005, 10, WT/MIN(05)/DEC [hereinafter Hong Kong Declaration] (setting
deadlines for agriculture negotiations); id. 23 (setting deadlines for non-
agricultural market access negotiations). The Doha Declaration originally estab-
lished a deadline of March 31, 2003 to reach agreement on modalities for agricul-
ture. See Doha Declaration, supra note 97, 14 ("Modalities for the further com-
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Given the suspension of negotiations, the Doha Round was not
completed by the end of 2006, making it impossible to conclude
negotiations in time to submit the agreement to Congress before
the President's "trade promotion authority" expires on July 1,
2007.102
Moreover, in addition to the general difficulty in completing
the Doha Round, the United States faces significant resistance on
its proposals concerning agricultural subsidies. The negotiating
strategy of the United States regarding farm supports has four core
elements: (1) creating a new category of Blue Box payments that
can be used to shield counter-cyclical payments; (2) preserving the
ability to classify direct payments within the Green Box; (3) agree-
ing to reduce the permissible level of its Amber Box support only
to a degree that can be largely offset by Blue Box, Green Box, and
de minimis payments; and (4) obtaining a new Peace Clause that
would protect agricultural subsidies from challenge under the
SCM Agreement.
4.1. The Blue Box
In the negotiations leading up to the July 2004 Framework, the
United States succeeded in obtaining tentative consent to create a
new category of Blue Box subsidies that would not require farmers
to limit production.103 Under this Framework, the total amount of
both conventional Blue Box subsidies and the new category of non-
production-limiting Blue Box payments would be capped at no
more than 5% of the average total value of agricultural production
by a country during a base period to be agreed upon.10 4 The
United States hopes to use a new category of Blue Box payments to
shield counter-cyclical payments from challenge. 105
mitments, including provisions for special and differential treatment, shall be es-
tablished no later than 31 March 2003.").
102 See Trade Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. § 3803(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2002) [hereinafter
Trade Act of 20021. Trade promotion authority, previously known as "fast track"
authority, allows the President to submit a proposed trade agreement to Congress
for an up or down vote without amendments and with limited debate. See id. §
3805(a)(1).
103 See General Council, Doha Work Programme, Annex A, 13, WT/L/579,
(Aug. 2, 2004) [hereinafter July 2004 Framework] ("Members may have recourse
to ... payments that do not require production . .
104 Id. 15.
105 OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA POLICY
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It is unclear whether this strategy will be successful. In re-
sponse to concerns expressed by many countries that this new Blue
Box provision could permit the United States to avoid making
meaningful reductions in its overall levels of domestic support, the
July 2004 Framework indicates that additional criteria will be nego-
tiated to ensure that Blue Box payments are less trade-distorting
than Amber Box subsidies. 10
6
There has been little progress in reaching an agreement on
what the "additional criteria" for the new category of Blue Box
payments should be.10 7 The United States has proposed limiting
total Blue Box spending to 2.5% of the total value of a country's ag-
ricultural production.108 If accepted, this proposal would permit
the U.S. to provide approximately $5 billion in counter-cyclical
payments each year. 109
However, the United States has encountered resistance to its
Blue Box strategy from the most influential block of developing na-
tions- the "Group of 20" ("G20") led by India and Brazil. The G20
has indicated that it would not accept the new category of Blue Box
payments unless the payments are subject to two restrictions: (1)
limits on how much of the gap between market and target prices
can be covered by the payments (i.e., "limits to price-gaps differen-
tials")110 and (2) limits on the total level of subsidies that could be
provided from all programs -including Blue Box payments-for
each agricultural product (i.e., "product-specific caps.").'
The Chairman of the WTO's Committee on Agriculture has in-
BRIEF: IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. AGRICULTURE PROPOSAL ON TRADE-DISTORTING
DOMESTIC SUPPORT 2 (2005), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library
/FactSheets/2005/asset-upload-file414_8527.pdf [hereinafter USTR, IMPLICA-
TIONS]. Counter-cyclical payments, like direct payments, are based on historic
production and do not require current production of any specific commodity for
eligibility. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
106 See July 2004 Framework, supra note 103, 14.
107 See Hong Kong Declaration, supra note 101, 9 ("There is important and
significant convergence on moving beyond (i.e. further constraining) Blue Box
program[] payments envisaged in the July 2004 Framework. However, the tech-
nique for achieving this remains to be determined.").
108 See U.S. Agriculture Proposal, supra note 71.
109 See USTR, IMPLICATIONS, supra note 105, at 2.
110 See GROUP OF 20, DRAFT ELEMENTS FOR DISCUSSION- BLUE Box (2005),
http://w-ww.sagpya.mecon.gov.ar/new/OO/programas/negociaciones/ Omc/ g2
0_06.pdf, at 1.
111 Id. at 1-2.
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dicated that there is broad support for a lower cap on Blue Box
payments, as proposed by the United States.112 However, the pro-
posals for commodity-specific caps remain controversial, although
the Chairman has suggested that there may be room to reach
agreement on rules that would limit the ability of governments to
concentrate their Blue Box payments on particular commodities.
1 3
The 2006 Draft Possible Modalities on Agriculture reflects continu-
ing demands from developing countries for restrictions on Blue
Box spending beyond the proposed 2.5% ad valorem limit.114 The
bracketed proposals for additional Blue Box restrictions include
caps on the amount of Blue Box support that can be provided to a
specific commodity based on a percentage of either (1) the overall
level of Blue Box spending or (2) the market value of the commod-
ity,115 limits on price-gap differentials,116 and a limit on provision of
Blue Box payments by a country has not complied with its obliga-
tions to provide the WTO with accurate and timely information re-
garding its subsidy programs.1 7 Adoption of any of these meas-
ures would severely compromise attempts by the United States to
reclassify counter-cyclical payments within the Blue Box.
4.2. The Green Box
In addition to attempting to negotiate an amendment of the
Blue Box that would permit it to shield counter-cyclical payments,
the United States will likely attempt to classify direct payments-
which currently total over $5 billion a year" 8 - as Green Box pay-
ments.1 9 There are several reasons to question whether this strat-
112 See SPECIAL SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, CHAIR'S REFERENCE
PAPER: BLUE Box (2001), http://www.wto.org/English/tratop-e/agric-e/ref_
paper.bluebox-e.pdf, 1.
113 Id. 3.
114 2006 Draft Possible Modalities on Agriculture, supra note 71, 65-77.
115 Id. 70.
116 Id. 71.
117 Id. 75-76.
118 See ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FARM INCOME AND COSTS:
FARM SECTOR INCOME FORECAST, (2006), available at http://www.ers.usda.
gov/ Briefing/ FarmIncome/Data/GPT7.htm.
119 Secretary of Agriculture Mike Johanns has stated that "we know we can
make direct payments without running afoul of WTO rules," presumably based
on the belief that direct payments can still be notified within the Green Box. Jo-
hanns Signals U.S. Subsidies Must Change in New Farm Bill, INSIDE US TRADE (Sept.
23, 2005). The USTR's explanation of the United States' October 2005 agriculture
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egy will be successful. Most obviously, the Appellate Body in the
Upland Cotton dispute upheld a ruling by the Panel that direct
payments do not fit within the Green Box because of the planting
flexibility restrictions. 120 The Appellate Body concluded that the
restrictions on planting fruits and vegetables violated the require-
ment that "decoupled income support" payments within the Green
Box should "not be related to... the type or volume of produc-
tion.., undertaken by the producer .... /1121
Legislation has been introduced in Congress that would re-
move the planting flexibility restrictions, therefore presumably al-
lowing direct payments to be classified as Green Box payments1 22
This legislation, however, is opposed by fruit and vegetable grow-
ers, who are concerned that it could depress prices for specialty
crops and force them to compete with farmers producing on subsi-
dized acreage.123
Moreover, even if the efforts to remove the planting flexibility
restrictions are successful and direct payments may be classified
within the Green Box, Green Box programs are no longer exempt
proposal similarly indicates that direct payments will not be included in the
United States' calculation of Amber Box support. USTR, IMPLICATIONS, supra note
105, at 2.
120 See Upland Cotton Appellate Body Report, supra note 29, 1 342.
121 Agreement on Agriculture Annex 2, 6(b). See Upland Cotton Appellate
Body Report, supra note 29, 310-42.
122 See The Farming Flexibility Act of 2005, S. 1038, 109th Cong. (1st Sess.
2005).
123 See, e.g., Statement Before the Subcomm. On Conservation, Credit, Rural Devel-
opment & Research of the H. Comm. on Agric. (2006) (testimony of John K. Shafer,
Specialty Crop Producer) available at http://agriculture.house.gov/hearings/
109/h60501wb.pdf:
Growers of specialty crops need continued protection when competing
against producers of "program crops" who receive a subsidy whether or
not that program crop is planted. The planting restriction for fruits and
vegetables has acted as a safety net for specialty crop producers who do
not receive direct payments. Researchers have predicted that even a one
percent increase in fruit and vegetable planting would result in no less
than a four percent decrease in prices.
See also Review of the Specialty Crop Industry Before the Subcomm. on Livestock and
Horticulture of the H. Comm. on Agric., 109th Cong. 82 (2005) (statement of Matt
Mclnerney, Executive Vice President, Western Growers) ("Western Growers re-
mains committed to ensuring that the fundamentally fair policy of prohibiting
subsidized growers from competing against growers who do not participate in
federal farm programs in the production of fruits and vegetables remains the law
of the land in the next farm bill .... ").
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from challenge under the SCM Agreement due to the expiration of
the Peace Clause. 124 Accordingly, the ability of the United States to
protect direct payments from challenge will depend upon the
completion of Doha Round and the agreement of the other WTO
Members to a new Peace Clause that applies to the Green Box.
The G20, however, is unwilling to accept renewed protection
for Green Box programs unless the Green Box is amended to re-
move what it considers to be the trade-distorting effects of direct
payments. 25 The July 2004 Framework states that the "Green Box
criteria will be reviewed with a view to ensuring that Green Box
measures have no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or
effects on production." 126 The "clarifications" that the G20 has
proposed pursuant to this mandate include restricting eligibility
for direct payments to low income farmers and capping the aggre-
gate amount of direct payments, Blue Box payments, and Amber
Box payments for each commodity. 127 The United States rejects
these proposals and insists that there should be "no material
changes in [the] Green Box, specifically no expenditure caps."
128
Nonetheless, the G20's proposals were included as bracketed text
in the 2006 Draft Possible Modalities on Agriculture. 29 Accordingly,
although it is unclear whether the G20's proposals will eventually
be accepted as part of a broader deal in the Doha Round, it would
be unwise for Congress to assume that it will be able to shield
unlimited amounts of direct payments from challenge within the
Green Box.
4.3. The Amber Box and Total Trade-Distorting Support
The July 2004 Framework proposed reductions in each country's
Amber Box limit130 and the "overall base level of all trade-
distorting domestic support," defined as the Amber Box limit "plus
permitted de minimis level and the level agreed.., for Blue Box
124 See supra Section 3.1.3.
125 See G20, Review and Clarification of Green Box Criteria, at 7-8,
G20/DS/Greenbox (Feb. 6, 2005) (explaining the framework for direct payment
structures and decoupled income support).
126 July 2004 Framework, supra note 103, Annex A, 16.
127 See Review and Clarification of Green Box Criteria, supra note 125, at 7-8.
128 U.S. Agriculture Proposal, supra note 71.
129 See 2006 Draft Possible Modalities on Agriculture, supra note 71, Annex H.
130 July 2004 Framework, supra note 103, Annex A, 9.
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payments."131
The reductions are to be made according to a tiered formula
under which the countries with higher levels of domestic support
would be required to make deeper cuts. 132 Overall trade-distorting
domestic support would be cut by a minimum of 20% in the first
year.13
3
The negotiations leading up to the December 2005 Ministerial
Conference in Hong Kong resulted in agreement on the basic pa-
rameters for reducing domestic support. Countries would be di-
vided into three "bands" according to their current levels of per-
mitted Amber Box support, with the European Union in the
highest band, the United States and Japan in the middle band, and
all other countries in the bottom band.134 Each country would be
required to reduce its Amber Box spending and overall trade-
distorting domestic support by specified percentages, with the
countries in higher bands making deeper cuts. 135
However, the WTO Members were unable to reach agreement
on the actual percentage reductions that would be required. The
United States proposed a formula under which Total AMS would
be reduced by 83% for the top band, by 60% for the middle band,
and 37% for the bottom band.136 The United States also proposed a
reduction of overall trade-distorting support by 75% for the top
band, 53% for the middle band, and 31% for countries in the bot-
tom band.137
131 Id. at Annex A, 7. See also 2006 Draft Possible Modalities on Agriculture,
supra note 71, at 1 ("'Overall Trade-Distorting Domestic Support' means the sum
of (i) the Final Bound Total AMS plus (ii) permitted de minimis level expressed in
monetary terms plus (iii) the Blue Box level .... ").
132 See July 2004 Framework, supra note 103, Annex A, 7 & 9 (stating the
tiered approach of agriculture modalities). The 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration
was arguably ambiguous on this point, indicating that the objective of the negotia-
tions with regard to trade-distorting domestic support was "substantial reduc-
tions," but not identifying the baseline from which those reductions would be
made. Doha Declaration, supra note 97, 13 (explaining the objectives of the 2000
Agreement on Agriculture).
133 July 2004 Framework, supra note 103, Annex A, 7.
134 See Towards NAMA Modalities, supra note 100, at 26 (providing specific
proposals for small, vulnerable economies).
135 Id.
136 See U.S. Agriculture Proposal, supra note 71 (outlining the suggested re-
ductions of AMS).
137 Id. The United States proposed that these reductions be made during a
five year implementation period, and that all trade distorting support be elimi-
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The European Union has proposed AMS reductions of 70% for
itself, 60% for the middle band, and 50% for the bottom band, with
similar reductions for overall trade-distorting support.138 Not sur-
prisingly, the G20 has proposed the most dramatic reductions:
80%, 70%, and 60% for AMS and 80%, 75%, and 70% for overall
trade-distorting support.139 The 2006 Draft Possible Modalities on
Agriculture reflects this range: AMS reductions of 70-83% for the
top band, 60-70% for the middle band, and 37-60% for the bottom
band 140 and total trade-distorting support reductions of 70-80% for
the top band, 53-75% for the middle band, and 31-70% for the bot-
tom band.1 41
An analysis conducted at the request of the United States, the
EU, and several other WTO Members indicates that the U.S. pro-
posal -although producing a dramatic cut in "final bound" AMS
to $7.6 billion-would still permit the United States to provide
over $22 billion in total trade-distorting support.142 Other WTO
Members have argued that accepting the U.S. proposal would ac-
tually permit the United States to increase its level of trade-
nated in fifteen years. See also USTR, IMPLICATIONS, supra note 105, at 2 (briefing
the policies and implications of the Doha Development Agenda).
138 See EU Proposal on Making Hong Kong a Success: Europe's Contribution, at 3
(Oct. 28, 2005) available at http://www.abcdoha.org/agriculture/pdfs/EU-
Proposal.pdf (outlining the EU's commitment to reducing domestic supports for
agricultural products).
139 See Report to WTO Trade Negotiations Committee, G-20 Proposal on Do-
mestic Support, 8, 12 (October 12, 2005) available at http://www.g-20.mre.
gov.br/conteudo/proposals-domesticsupport.pdf (proposing reductions in ag-
gregate measure of support).
140 See 2006 Draft Possible Modalities, supra note 71, 50.
141 Id. 79.
142 See Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture, Agriculture Negotia-
tions: Agriculture Domestic Support Simulations, JOB(06)/151, at 15-16 (May 22,
2006) [hereinafter Agriculture Domestic Support Simulations] (projecting a U.S. limit
on total trade distorting support of $22.665 billion using 1995-2000 as base years
and $22.438 billion using 1999-2001 as base years"). Yet despite the skepticism of
its trading partners, it appears that the U.S. proposal would require significant re-
structuring of current farm subsidy programs. Most conspicuously, it would be
impossible to accommodate the current level of Amber Box spending within the
proposed cap of $7.6 billion. Under the Agreement on Agriculture, the AMS cal-
culation for market price support programs is based on the difference between the
target price for the commodity and the world market price in the years 1986-1988.
See Agreement on Agriculture Annex 3, 8-9. Using this methodology, the
price support programs for dairy and sugar collectively account for about $6 bil-
lion of Amber Box space. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., RISK MANAGEMENT PAPER, supra
note 19, at 21.
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distorting domestic support and have indicated that the Doha
Round negotiations cannot be successfully concluded unless the
United States significantly improves its offer on domestic sup-
port.143 However, the United States has refused to alter its domes-
tic support offer without new concessions on market access from
the EU and developing countries. 44
It is unclear when and on what terms a compromise might be
reached concerning the classification and permissible levels of sub-
sidies within the various boxes of the Agreement on Agriculture.
1 45
Yet even if the United States is somehow able to negotiate an out-
come that permits it to accommodate its current subsidy programs
within the Agreement on Agriculture's boxes, U.S. farm subsidies
will remain highly vulnerable to challenge under the SCM Agree-
ment without a new Peace Clause.
146
4.4. The Peace Clause
The United States has long sought-until fairly recently with
the support of the European Union-to obtain a new Peace Clause
through the Doha Round negotiations. 147 However, it appears that
the United States has become increasingly isolated on this issue. In
early 2006, the EU reportedly dropped its demand for a new Peace
Clause,148 and there is no reference to a new Peace Clause in the
143 See Chambliss Says U.S. Could Reduce Farm Support To Spur Doha Deal,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, July 14, 2006 ("Overall, the U.S. has proposed to limit its total
trade-distorting support to no more than $22.6 billion [] per year, which the EU
and other trading partners argue is not enough since they say it is a higher ceiling
than current U.S. spending on trade-distorting support.").
144 See U.S. Lowers Ag Market Access Demands for Potential Doha Deal, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, June 23, 2006 ("The [USTR] statement concluded that the [United
States] would not accept an outcome nor put forward a proposal falling short of
creating new trade flows in agriculture, industrial market access, and services.").
145 There are various other outstanding issues that could complicate the
United States' attempt to protect its farm subsidies from challenge under the
Agreement on Agriculture, including proposals for commodity specific AMS lim-
its and proposals to reduce permissible de minimis support by as much as 80%. See
2006 Draft Possible Modalities on Agriculture, supra note 71, at 62.
146 See discussion supra Sections 3.1.3 and 3.2.
147 See, e.g., U.S. Agriculture Proposal, supra note 71 (requesting "[l]itigation
protection ('peace clause') for subsidy programs that stay under the new limits or
conform to 'green box' criteria.").
148 See Daniel Pruzin, Agriculture: EU Signals Flexibility on Peace Clause In WTO
Ag Talks, Despite U.S. Position, INT'L TRADE DAILY, Feb. 1, 2006 ("The European Un-
ion has signaled it may be prepared to accept a Doha Round agreement on agri-
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July 2004 Framework, the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, or
the 2006 Agriculture Modalities Draft.149 Although the USTR con-
tinues to request a Peace Clause as part of any new deal on agricul-
tural subsidies, U.S. trade officials appear to understand that a new
Peace Clause is unlikely given the opposition from the vast major-
ity of WTO Members.
During her confirmation hearings in May of 2006, United States
Trade Representative Susan Schwab acknowledged that no Mem-
ber of the WTO has supported the U.S. request for a new Peace
Clause and declined to state that this was a non-negotiable de-
mand.150 The USTR continues to express support for a new Peace
Clause but refuses to describe it as an essential element of a deal on
agricultural subsidies.'5' Arguably, given both the strong opposi-
tion to a new Peace Clause from many developing countries 52 and
the USTR's reluctance to describe the issue as a deal-breaker, con-
tinuing expressions of support for a new Peace Clause are better
understood as attempts to appear responsive to the demands of
politically powerful commodity groups than as reflections of what
the USTR thinks is achievable in the Doha negotiations.
In the absence of a new Peace Clause, any agreement concern-
ing the permissible levels and classification of subsidies under the
Agreement on Agriculture will provide only limited protection to
U.S. farm supports. Actionable subsidies would still be subject to
challenge under the SCM Agreement-on a commodity-by-
commodity basis -if they can be shown to cause serious prejudice
or other form of "adverse effect" to another WTO Member, regard-
culture without a 'peace clause' to shield its farm subsidy programs from future
WTO dispute settlement challenges.").
149 See generally July 2004 Framework, supra note 103; Hong Kong Declaration,
supra note 101; 2006 Draft Possible Modalities on Agriculture, supra note 71.
150 See Written Responses to Senate Finance Committee Questions for the Record 36
(May 17, 2006) (statement of Honorable Susan Schwab) ("No Member has yet in-
dicated its support for the U.S. proposal. However, the United States will con-
tinue to push for its October proposal in the negotiations.").
151 See, e.g., Awaiting Draft Modalities Text, Members Still Divided on Ag Market
Access, BRIDGES-WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST, June 21, 2006, at 1 (noting that a
USTR spokesman "indicated that a new 'peace clause' was still an 'important' ob-
jective for the US, though he declined to comment on whether this would be one
of Washington's basic conditions for a deal.").
152 See Mammoth Task Awaits Ministers as Ag Chair Tables Blu.eprint for Modali-
ties Deal, BRIDGES-WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST, June 28, 2006, at 3 (noting that
many WTO members have "strenuously opposed" a new Peace Clause).
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less of whether they violate any new limit on Amber Box support
or are categorized as Blue or Green Box support.
For example, assume that a deal in the Doha negotiations was
reached establishing a limit of $20 billion in overall trade-distorting
support for the United States and permitting counter-cyclical pay-
ments to be reclassified within the Blue Box.
Without a new Peace Clause, if world market prices for corn
fell significantly and, as a result, counter-cyclical and marketing
loan payments to U.S. corn farmers rose to a level that caused seri-
ous prejudice to other WTO Members, those subsidies could be
successfully challenged under the SCM Agreement even if the
United States stayed within its limits for Amber Box and overall
trade-distorting support. Accordingly, any deal on Boxes and lim-
its under Agreement on Agriculture that does not include a new
Peace Clause will leave the current U.S. farm program highly vul-
nerable to challenge.
5. GUIDELINES FOR DRAFTING A WTO-COMPLIANT FARM BILL
THAT MAINTAINS THE CURRENT BASELINE
Although it appears unlikely that USTR will be able to negoti-
ate a new Peace Clause, the United States has at least three other
options for responding to the threat posed to U.S. commodity pro-
grams under the SCM Agreement: (1) continue the existing pro-
grams and accept the resulting sanctions that would be authorized
through the WTO's dispute settlement process; (2) eliminate or
significantly reduce the relevant subsidy programs and accept the
resulting reduction in the baseline of federal spending on rural
communities; or (3) maintain the current baseline of Farm Bill
spending by shifting funding into programs that are not vulnerable
to challenge under the SCM Agreement.
The first option, while not an improbable outcome in the short
term given the strong support for the commodity programs in
Congress, is unlikely to provide a durable solution. The service
and industrial sectors of the U.S. economy-which collectively ac-
count for 99% of gross domestic product153-will not be able to ad-
vance their agendas within the WTO negotiations until the impasse
153 See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 584 (2006). Ag-
riculture accounts for only 1% of U.S. gross domestic product, as compared with
20.7% for industry, and 78.3% for services.
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over agricultural subsidies is resolved. At some point, these sec-
tors will begin to exert pressure on Congress to bring U.S. farm
subsidy programs into compliance with the relevant WTO disci-
plines.
Non-agricultural sectors will have further incentives to lobby
for subsidy reform if, as appears likely, the dispute settlement
process results in "cross sectoral retaliation" -i.e., the imposition
of trade sanctions on other sectors of the economy in retaliation for
illegal U.S. farm subsidies. Brazil is already pursuing this ap-
proach in the Upland Cotton dispute, indicating that it will target
the intellectual property rights of U.S. corporations (including
copyrights, trademarks and patents) and U.S. service industries
(including business, communications, and financial services).
154
Similar challenges involving other commodities are likely to fol-
low, most likely beginning with a challenge to U.S. rice subsidies
by Uruguay.155 Presumably, at some point the industries affected
by these sanctions will have a strong incentive to lobby Congress
to reform the offending subsidy programs.
15 6
The second option -the elimination or significant reduction of
farm subsidies with a corresponding reduction of Farm Bill spend-
ing-would address the potential for trade conflict but is unlikely
to be politically acceptable. There is a strong perception in Con-
gress that the United States is being asked to make dramatic reduc-
tions in farm subsidies while the EU and developing countries re-
fuse to make comparable reductions in agricultural tariffs.15 7
154 See Communication, United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, Recourse to
Article 7.9 of the SCM Agreement and Article 22.2 of the DSU by Brazil,
WT/DS267/26 (Oct. 7, 2005).
155 See David Haskel, Agriculture: Uruguay Gives More Time for Talks with U.S.
Over Rice Dispute, Delays VATO Panel Request, INT'L TRADE DAILY, Oct. 26, 2005 (giv-
ing more time to resolve dispute over American rice subsidies before going to
WTO).
156 See Jerry Hagstrom, Glickman Back To Farm Policy In Urging WATO Compli-
ance, CONGRESS DAILY (May 8, 2006) (quoting Dan Glickman, President of the Mo-
tion Picture Association of America, as noting that "[i]f... the worst came to pass
and countries begin to retaliate, it would begin to bring non-agricultural indus-
tries into the making of agricultural policy in a negative way") (noting that a Bra-
zilian suspension of concessions and other obligations on impacts of U.S. goods
would be neither practicable nor effective.").
157 In response to press reports in late June 2006 that the United States was
considering offering further reductions in its farm subsidies, fifty-seven Senators
wrote to President Bush urging him to reject any "unbalanced" deal that would
require further cuts in U.S. farm subsidies without comparable reductions in other
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However, there is little indication that U.S. demands on market ac-
cess will be met in the near future. 158 Accordingly, Congress is
unlikely to approve a dramatic reduction in trade-distorting subsi-
dies in the next farm bill unless, under option three, that reduction
is offset by funding for other programs that benefit rural and agri-
cultural communities.
As discussed below, three guidelines can be used to identify
the types of programs that might be included in future farm bills
without risk of trade conflict: (a) eliminate or reduce price-
contingent programs; (b) avoid concentrating benefits on a limited
number of commodities; and (c) support "non-specific" programs,
including rural development, infrastructure, conservation, and nu-
trition programs.
5.1. Eliminate or Limit Price-Contingent Programs
The reports of the Panel and the Appellate Body in the Upland
Cotton dispute indicate that price-contingent subsidies are particu-
countries' agricultural tariffs. See Press Release, Kent Conrad, United States Sena-
tor, North Dakota, Majority of Senators Join Conrad on Trade: Conrad Letter Calls
on White House to Reject Unfair WTO Deal (June 23, 2006), available at
http://conrad.senate.gov/-conrad/releases/06/06/2006623933.html. There is
some merit to the charge that the United States is being asked to accept an "un-
balanced" deal on agriculture given that the European Union is insisting on the
right to maintain much higher levels of both subsidies and tariffs for agricultural
products. Under the EU's proposed formula for reducing agricultural subsidies, it
would be able to provide between $42-43 billion in total trade-distorting support,
while the United States would only be allowed about $19 billion in total trade-
distorting support. See Agriculture Domestic Support Simulations, supra note 142, at
15-16. Similarly, the EU has proposed a tariff formula that would permit it to
maintain an average bound tariff rate of 13.16%, as compared with an average
bound rate of only 7.46% for the United States. See Special Session of the Commit-
tee on Agriculture, Applied Tariff Simulations-Agriculture, Summary of Results,
JOB(06)/152 at 2 (May 22, 2006). However, the United States is at a tactical disad-
vantage in insisting on substantial new market access concessions in exchange for
further reductions in U.S. domestic support. As long as the WTO Members fail to
reach agreement in the Doha Round, countries with high agricultural tariffs may
maintain those tariffs while U.S. farm subsidies remain vulnerable to challenge
under the SCM Agreement.
158 See, e.g., Press Release, Government of India, Ministry of Commerce & In-
dustry, India Sticks to its Guns in WTO Talks: Kamal Nath Says Trade Inequalities
Unacceptable Uuly 24, 2006), http://www.heindia-av.org/nc-images/july06-
release.pdf ("Developing countries cannot allow their subsistence farmers to lose
their livelihood security and food security to provide market access to agricultural
products from developed countries.").
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larly vulnerable to significant price suppression claims under the
SCM Agreement. 159 Accordingly, the most obvious principle for
Congress to follow in order to minimize the risk of trade conflict is
to eliminate or at least significantly reduce price-linked commodity
subsidies. This could be accomplished in a variety of ways, includ-
ing completely eliminating counter-cyclical and marketing loan
program payments, lowering the target prices for these programs,
or imposing more stringent payment limitations for individual
farmers.160
However, reducing or eliminating counter-cyclical and market-
ing loan program payments would be of limited value in address-
ing the risk of trade conflict if these payments were replaced by
other price-contingent subsidies, as the USDA has recently pro-
posed. In May 2006, the USDA identified, as a possible alternative
to counter-cyclical and marketing loan payments, a program that
would guarantee farmers a certain level of revenue in order to pro-
tect them from fluctuations in crop yield or market price.161 The
USDA apparently believes that this type of program could be con-
sistent with the relevant WTO subsidy disciplines because para-
graph 7 of the WTO's Green Box Annex provides for "income in-
surance and income safety-net programmes." 162
There are, however, a variety of problems with this approach.
It is questionable whether a revenue guarantee program could be
enacted that would satisfy the provisions of paragraph 7, which in-
cludes a requirement that the payments be available to all produc-
ers who suffer more than a 30% loss in income, regardless of what
159 See Upland Cotton Appellate Body Report, supra note 29, at 395; see also
Section 3.2.1.2.
160 Under the 2002 Farm Bill, direct payments are capped at $40,000 per per-
son, counter-cyclical payments at $65,000 per person, and some marketing loan
program payments at $75,000 per person. See 2002 Farm Bill § 1603. However,
these limits may be doubled under loopholes that allow spouses to be treated
separately and that permit a person to receive payments through three separate
business entities. See MONKE, supra note 21, at 3. In addition, commodity certifi-
cate gains under the marketing loan program are not limited. Id.
161 See U.S. DEPYT OF AGRIC., RISK MANAGEMENT PAPER, supra note 19, at 24-26.
162 Agreement on Agriculture Annex 2, 7(a). See also U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,
RISK MANAGEMENT PAPER, supra note 19, at 25 (discussing potential for an income
guarantee program to fit within the Green Box's "income safety net" provisions).
However, the USDA appears to be ambivalent about the WTO-compliance poten-
tial of this approach. See id. at 3 (noting that "WTO concerns may be reduced but
not eliminated" by replacing counter-cyclical and marketing loan payments with
an income guarantee program).
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crop(s) they produce. 63 Accordingly, a revenue guarantee pro-
gram would need to be available to all U.S. farmers, which could
make such a program both burdensome to administer and ex-
tremely expensive, unless the revenue guarantee was set at a level
low enough to fit within the Green Box'64
Moreover, even if an income guarantee program could be de-
signed that complied with the terms of paragraph 7 and was there-
fore excluded from the calculation of the United States' AMS
limit,165 it would do nothing to prevent challenges under the SCM
Agreement in the absence of a new Peace Clause.166 Because com-
modity prices are one of the major variables that determine farm-
ers' income and therefore affect eligibility for payments, such a
program would presumably be considered price-contingent and
therefore likely to be trade-distorting.
167
5.2. Avoid Concentrating Benefits on a Few Commodities
Another relatively simple guideline that Congress could use to
draft a WTO-compliant Farm Bill would be to avoid programs that
163 See Agreement on Agriculture Annex 2, 7(a) ("Any producer [suffering a
30% income loss] shall be eligible to receive the payments ...."); see also id. 7 (b)
("the amount of such payments shall relate solely to income; it shall not relate to
the type or volume of production... undertaken by the producer .... ).
164 See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., RISK MANAGEMENT PAPER, supra note 19, at 24
(noting potential record keeping burden of a revenue guarantee program that
covered all commodities); id. at 26 (discussing cost implications of a revenue
guarantee program that extended to commodities not covered under current sub-
sidy programs).
165 See supra Section 3.1.1.
166 See supra Section 3.1.3. USDA's risk management paper discusses the clas-
sification of subsidies within the boxes of the Agreement on Agriculture but does
not mention the Peace Clause and only briefly discusses the threat of serious
prejudice challenges under the SCM Agreement. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., RISK
MANAGEMENT PAPER, supra note 19, at 20-22.
167 Admittedly, the text of paragraph 7 of the Green Box Annex suggests that
it is possible to implement an income guarantee program that would not be price
contingent, stating that "the amount of such payments shall relate solely to in-
come; it shall not relate to... [commodity] prices, domestic or international ...."
Agreement on Agriculture Annex 2, 7(c). Given that the market price of the
commodities grown by a farmer is a major factor determining the farmer's in-
come, it is not clear how a payment program based on income would not also be
"related to" the relevant commodity prices. In any event, in the absence of a new
Peace Clause an income guarantee program would be vulnerable to challenge un-
der the SCM Agreement regardless of whether it conformed to the relevant Green
Box criteria.
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concentrate their benefits on a small number of commodities. Dur-
ing the years 2002-2005, USDA estimates that 93% of the commod-
ity program payments went to producers of upland cotton, rice,
corn, soybeans and wheat.168 This concentration of payments on a
few crops results in high ad valorem rates of subsidization, making
those payments vulnerable to serious prejudice claims under the
SCM Agreement.
169
It has been suggested that Congress could continue to funnel a
comparable level of farm supports to these commodities and avoid
trade conflicts by simply moving the payments into non-price con-
tingent programs such as direct payments. 170 Shifting funding to
direct payments would presumably reduce the threat of trade con-
flict given the emphasis placed by both the Panel and the Appellate
Body in the Upland Cotton dispute on the relationship between
price-contingency and significant price suppression.
171
Nonetheless, there are serious problems with this approach,
both in terms of reducing the risk of challenges under the SCM
Agreement and threatening the negotiating position of the United
States in the Doha Round. Although the Appellate Body upheld
the Panel's determination that direct payments to upland cotton
farmers did not cause serious prejudice, it indicated that non-price
contingent programs could contribute to serious prejudice.172 A
finding that direct payments cause serious prejudice would be par-
ticularly likely if a Panel were to aggregate the effects of both price-
contingent and non-price contingent programs or if the WTO were
to reinstitute the 5% Dark Amber threshold for a presumption of
serious prejudice. 1
73
Moreover, even in the absence of new dispute settlement pro-
ceedings, the G20 has made it clear that it views direct payments as
potentially trade-distorting and has proposed various changes to
the Green Box, such as limiting direct payments to low-income
farmers and imposing product-specific caps, that would make it
extremely difficult to significantly increase the level of direct pay-
168 See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., RISK MANAGEMENT PAPER, supra note 19, at 19.
169 See supra Section 3.2.1.1.
170 See supra note 119.
171 See supra Section 3.2.1.2.
172 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
173 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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ments for eligible commodities. 174 Accordingly, any attempt to
shift counter-cyclical and marketing loan program funds into di-
rect payments for the same commodities would be likely to further
complicate the United States' efforts to conclude the Doha Round
negotiations.
As discussed below, there is an alternative approach that
would allow Congress to maintain the current baseline of farm bill
spending without significant risk of trade conflict: shifting funds
from subsidy programs that benefit only a few commodities to
"non-specific" programs that benefit all agricultural producers or
other elements of the rural economy.
5.3. Support "Non-Specific" Rural Development and Environmental
Programs
In order to be subject to the SCM Agreement, a subsidy pro-
gram must be "specific" to certain enterprises or industries.
75
There are a variety of existing programs that would not meet the
SCM Agreement's definition of specificity, most obviously pro-
grams designed to promote development of the rural economy in
general rather than the production of certain commodities. For ex-
ample, the Rural Development title of the 2002 Farm Bill includes a
variety of non-specific programs such as the Rural Strategic In-
vestment Program, which authorized funding for creating and im-
plementing regional development strategies. 76 The Rural Devel-
opment title also provides support for various types of
infrastructure in rural communities that would be considered non-
specific and therefore not actionable, including electricity, broad-
band internet, and waste-disposal facilities.177
174 See Review and Clarification of Green Box Criteria, supra note 125, at 1-2.
175 See SCM Agreement art. 2.1.
176 See 2002 Farm Bill § 6030. Congress, however, never appropriated funds
to implement the Rural Strategic Investment Program. See U.S. DEP'T. OF AGRIC.,
2007 FARM BILL THEME PAPERS - RURAL DEVELOPMENT at 32 (2006), available at
http://www.usda.gov/documents/Farmbill07ruraldevelopment.pdf (indicating
that three initiatives, which included the Regional Strategic Investment Program
were not funded).) [hereinafter U.S DEP'T OF AGRIC., RURAL DEVELOPMENT PAPER].
177 See 2002 Farm Bill § 6101 (grants for water and wastewater facilities); id. §
6101 (loan guarantees for rural electrification projects); id. § 6103 (loans and loan
guarantees for broadband service). In addition to being non-specific, infrastruc-
ture projects-to the extent that they are "general infrastructure" -do not even
constitute subsidies as defined in the SCM Agreement. See SCM Agreement art.
1.1(a)(iii) ("a subsidy shall be deemed to exist where ... a government provides
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In addition to general rural development programs, even pro-
grams designed to benefit the farm sector could be considered non-
specific if they are available to all agricultural producers.178 Under
Article 2 of the SCM Agreement, a subsidy must be limited to "an
enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries" 179 in
order to be considered specific; programs available throughout the
entire farm sector are therefore unlikely to be considered to be spe-
cific.180
There are a variety of provisions in the Conservation Title of
the 2002 Farm Bill that would also be considered non-specific be-
cause they are available to all agricultural producers. For example,
the Conservation Reserve Program pays farmers to take highly
erodible cropland and other environmentally sensitive lands out of
production l l and the Conservation Security Program provides
farmers with financial support for implementing conservation
goods or services other than general infrastructure...") (emphasis added). Infra-
structure projects are also listed in Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture as a
permissible category of Green Box programs. See Agreement on Agriculture An-
nex 2, para. 2 (g).
178 In addition, conservation programs that meet applicable criteria may be
classified within the Green Box and are therefore exempt from Amber Box reduc-
tion commitments. See Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 2, para. 10 ("structural
adjustment assistance provided through resource retirement programs"); para. 12
("payments under environmental programmes").
179 SCM Agreement art. 2.1.
180 See Chambovey, supra note 43, at 321 ("[A] subsidy would not be regarded
as specific because it is only available to the agricultural sector."); Alan 0. Sykes,
The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, at 20 (Uni-
versity of Chicago, Working Paper No. 186, 2003) ("[A] program that gave assis-
tance to all farmers regardless of what they grow would not be specific."). This
interpretation of specificity is supported by United States countervailing duty
regulations. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.502(d) (2006) ("(d) Agricultural subsidies. The Sec-
retary will not regard a subsidy as being specific.., solely because the subsidy is
limited to the agricultural sector .. "). However, a program that is formally
available to the entire agricultural sector, but that in practice concentrates its bene-
fits on producers of a particular commodity or group of commodities, could be
found to be specific. See SCM Agreement art. 2.1(c) (indicating factors that a sub-
sidy may be specific include "use of a subsidy programme by a limited number of
certain enterprises, predominant use by certain enterprises, the granting of dis-
proportionately large amounts of subsidy to certain enterprises, and the manner
in which discretion has been exercised by the granting authority in the decision to
grant a subsidy").
181 See 2002 Farm Bill § 2101. Conservation Reserve Program contracts are
available for both cropland and pasture land. 16 U.S.C. § 3831(b).
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practices on working agricultural lands. 182
Similarly, there are numerous provisions in other titles of the
2002 Farm Bill that are non-specific to particular commodities. Ex-
amples include a program in the Energy Title that provides "farm-
ers, ranchers, and rural small businesses" with up to 25% of the
cost of purchasing renewable energy systems or improving the en-
ergy efficiency of their operation 83 and a provision in the "Nutri-
tion Programs" title that provides support for community food
projects without any restrictions concerning eligible commodi-
ties.184
By shifting funds from subsidies that benefit producers of only
a few commodities to non-commodity specific programs such as
these, Congress could maintain - or in theory even increase - the
current baseline of Farm Bill spending without risk of trade con-
flict.
6. CONCLUSION
The collapse of the Doha Round negotiations eliminates, at
least for the foreseeable future, the possibility that the USTR will be
able to protect farm subsidy programs from challenge by negotiat-
ing a new Peace Clause. It is unclear how Congress will respond.
The conventional wisdom appears to be that the failure to com-
plete the Doha Round will encourage Congress to continue the
current subsidy programs rather than "unilaterally disarming" on
agricultural trade.185 Yet given the expiration of the Peace Clause,
this approach is likely to result in new challenges to farm subsidies
and the imposition of sanctions on non-agricultural sectors of the
U.S. economy. Accordingly, any continuation of the current farm
subsidy programs would be best understood not as a viable long-
term solution but rather as a short-term political response, driven
both by the influence of the commodity producers and Congress's
182 See id. §§ 2001-06.. Producers of "any crop or livestock" may participate
in the Conservation Security Program. Id. § 3838(9)(A).
183 Id. § 9006.
184 Id. § 4125.
185 See Statement by Bob Stallman, President, American Farm Bureau Federa-
tion, Regarding Need to Extend Farm Bill TPA in Light of Suspension of Doha
Round (July 27, 2006), available at http://www.fb.org/index.php?fuseaction
=newsroom.newsfocus&year=2006&file=nr0727.html (asserting that the current
farm program should be continued for one more year, given the lack of progress
in the Doha Round).
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apparent lack of understanding of the precarious status of U.S.
subsidy programs under the SCM Agreement.
A more durable solution would be for Congress to enact a new
Farm Bill that shifts funding from subsidies that are concentrated
on a few crops to a wide array of non-specific rural development,
infrastructure, conservation and nutrition programs. This ap-
proach would enable the United States to maintain its current base-
line of Farm Bill spending while eliminating the threat of trade
complaints and removing U.S. farm subsidies as an obstacle to the
completion of the Doha Round.
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